We compare the ex ante observable risk characteristics and the default rates of securitized mortgage loans and mortgage loans retained by the original lender. We find that privately securitized loans tend to be riskier and to default at a faster rate than loans securitized with the GSEs and lender-retained loans. However, the differences in default rates across investor types are of secondary importance for explaining mortgage defaults compared to more conventional predictors, such as original loan-to-value ratios and the path for house prices. Privately securitized home mortages have conditionally higher expected returns than retained loans, suggesting the presence of risk factors that are unobservable but nonetheless at least partially acknowledged by the market.

The empirical research literature regarding the effects of market structure on small business lending has yielded ambiguous results. This paper empirically tests for the presence of countervailing effects of increases in market concentration on small business loan volume. Countervailing effects would be expected if both the traditional Structure, Conduct, Performance (SCP) paradigm of industrial organization and a paradigm whereby market power benefits the formation of lending relationships (the relationship hypothesis), are at work. Using Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) data on small loans to small businesses, it is found that, on average, across MSAs, SCP effects dominate. But, as predicted by the relationship hypothesis, the negative effects of increases in concentration on small business loan volume are weaker, the greater the presence of young firms and the higher the business failure rate. Relationship effects due to business failure appear to come from highly concentrated MSAs. Endogeneity concerns are further addressed with the estimation of a regression that separates out the effects of changes in the number of lenders from the effects of changes in the sum of squared deviations of market shares.

Bank holding company (BHC) expansion into nonbank financial activities may increase or decrease the standard deviation of BHC ROA and/or the probability of bankruptcy of the BHC. Using individual firm data and a new application of a simulated merger methodology, I find the standard-deviation minimizing and bankruptcy-probability minimizing nonbank weights for a variety of nonbanking activities for two time periods, 1979-1986 and 1987-1997, for all BHCs and for large BHCs. I find that relatively substantial levels of investment in life insurance underwriting are optimal for reducing the standard deviation of BHC ROA. Appreciable levels of investment in life insurance underwriting, casualty insurance underwriting, and securities brokerage are optimal for reducing the probability of bankruptcy of the BHC.

The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) encourages lenders to make mortgage loans to certain classes of borrowers. However, the law does not apply to all lenders, and lenders do not necessarily receive credit for all loans made to borrowers of a particular class. We use this variation to test whether or not CRA-affected lenders cut interest rates to CRA-eligible borrowers; in other words, we test for the presence of a regulation-driven subsidy. Our theory suggests that loans made by commercial banks and savings associations ("relationship lenders") and mortgage companies ("transaction lenders") will differ from one another depending on borrower risk and homeownership benefits. Empirically, we find that CRA-eligible loans at CRA-affected institutions do carry lower mortgage spreads compared with other loans at the same institution. However, once we control for risk and benefit effects suggested by our theory, these differences in mortgage spreads become economically and statistically insignificant.

In this paper, we consider three issues raised by the apparent inconsistency between the current research practice of using county-based markets (Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) and non-MSA counties) to investigate the validity of the theoretical underpinnings of bank merger policy and the current regulatory practice of using Federal Reserve (FR) banking markets, which often do not follow county lines, to implement that policy. Using a national sample of bank and thrift branch deposit data, we find that county-based areas cannot simply substitute for FR markets in the implementation of bank merger policy. For example, numerous potential mergers would raise competitive issues in county-based areas, but not in FR markets, and vice versa. We also conclude that, because of the relative difficulty of assembling demographic data for non-county-based areas, it is impractical to consistently use FR markets in bank merger policy research. However, we do find that, despite the inconsistencies between the two types of markets, analysis that uses county-based areas is relevant for bank merger policy that is implemented with FR markets. For example, we find that profitability regression results using variables based on FR markets are similar to those found using variables based on MSAs and non-MSA counties.

Home-purchase lending to lower-income and minority households and neighborhoods has expanded significantly and at a faster rate than lending to other borrowers in recent years. Over the same period, however, an increasing proportion of applicants for conventional home-purchase mortgages, including lower-income and minority applicants, have had their applications denied. The first trend often has been taken as evidence that lenders' efforts to expand credit availability have been successful, whereas the second trend has contributed to concerns about access to credit and the fairness of the lending process. An important but little-recognized force behind the shift of credit toward lower-income and minority borrowers has been a rapid expansion of activity by subprime and manufactured-home lenders, lenders who are oriented toward lower-income and minority households. Using data collected under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) from 1993 to 1998, this article finds that part of the growth in mortgage lending and most of the increase in denial rates are associated with the substantial and growing share of mortgage activity of institutions that specialize in subprime and manufactured-home lending.