Federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco

Economic Letter

Brief summaries of SF Fed economic research that explain in reader-friendly terms what our work means for the people we serve.

  • The Asymmetric Costs of Misperceiving R-star

    2021-01

    Andrea Ajello, Isabel Cairó, Vasco Cúrdia, and Albert Queralto

    The natural rate of interest, or r-star, is used to evaluate whether monetary policy is restrictive or supportive of economic activity. However, this benchmark rate can only be estimated, and policymakers’ misperceptions of the level of the natural rate can carry substantial economic costs in terms of unemployment and inflation. A scenario using mistaken perceptions shows that the costs of overestimating the natural rate are greater than the cost of underestimating it if policy space is limited by the effective lower bound on the nominal federal funds rate.

  • 2020 Lessons, 2021 Priorities

    2020-37

    Mary C. Daly

    What lessons should we take from a difficult year—and what should our priorities be for 2021? Overcoming the harsh and uneven economic impacts of COVID-19 and returning to full employment and sustainable 2% inflation will be the Federal Reserve’s chief concerns. But success will require us to have confidence in the power of our tools. The following is adapted from a presentation by the president and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco to the Arizona State University Economic Forecast Luncheon on December 1.

  • Permanent and Transitory Effects of the 2008–09 Recession

    2020-36

    Andrew Foerster and Lily M. Seitelman

    Separating U.S. economic output into permanent and transitory components can help explain the effects of recessions and expansions. GDP growth shifted to a lower trend rate in 2000, indicating a slowdown long before the 2008–09 recession. GDP was substantially above trend before that recession; it then declined significantly and did not recover to its trend rate until 2017. The recession resulted in permanent losses to GDP. Without those permanent effects, GDP at the end of the latest expansion would have been about $380 billion or $1,460 per person higher.

  • Small Business Lending during COVID-19

    2020-35

    Remy Beauregard, Jose A. Lopez, and Mark M. Spiegel

    Small businesses and farms were hit hard by restrictions that limited their ability to pay operating costs during the COVID-19 crisis. Banks played an important supportive role, substantially expanding the loans available to these firms during the early months of the crisis. The growth in lending was associated with small business participation in the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) and bank use of the PPP Liquidity Facility. Analyzing data for the first half of 2020 suggests that these programs were successful in supporting lending growth during the crisis, particularly among small banks.

  • Temporary Layoffs and Unemployment in the Pandemic

    2020-34

    Erin Wolcott, Mitchell G. Ochse, Marianna Kudlyak, and Noah A. Kouchekinia

    Temporary layoffs accounted for essentially the entire increase in unemployment to its historically high rate in April 2020. Although the rate has come down since its peak, unemployment remains well above pre-pandemic levels. There is little evidence that temporary layoffs are becoming permanent at a higher rate than in the past. However, the continuation of the health and economic crisis poses a risk that a growing share of unemployment will consist of people in persistent categories of joblessness, thereby slowing the overall recovery.

  • Sudden Stops and COVID-19: Lessons from Mexico’s History

    2020-33

    Gianluca Benigno, Andrew Foerster, Christopher Otrok, and Alessandro Rebucci

    The COVID-19 pandemic produced a sharp contraction in capital flows in emerging markets during the spring of 2020. Such contractions are known as “sudden stops” and historically have been associated with significant downturns in a country’s economic activity. Evidence from Mexico’s financial crisis history suggests that sudden stops tend to exhibit a common pattern: the crisis lasts one to two years before a rapid but partial recovery, followed by years of protracted stagnation.

  • Is the Federal Reserve Contributing to Economic Inequality?

    2020-32

    Mary C. Daly

    Not every American gets the same chance at life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. We have to acknowledge and confront this reality—as individuals, as institutions, and as a nation. The Fed can help create more inclusive economic success by finding full employment experientially. But achieving true equality will require commitment from all of us. The following reflects remarks delivered in a virtual presentation by the president and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco to the University of California, Irvine, on October 13.

  • Assessing Recent Stock Market Valuation with Macro Data

    2020-31

    Kevin J. Lansing

    History suggests that elevated values of the cyclically adjusted price-earnings (CAPE) ratio may indicate an overvalued stock market. A valuation model that uses a small set of economic variables can help account for movements in the CAPE ratio over the past six decades. One of these variables is a macroeconomic uncertainty index. Comparing the model’s prediction for the second and third quarters of 2020 to the 2008–2009 period suggests that investors have reacted to macroeconomic uncertainty very differently during the COVID-19 outbreak than they did during the financial crisis.

  • Risk of Business Insolvency during Coronavirus Crisis

    2020-30

    Sophia M. Friesenhahn and Simon H. Kwan

    Many businesses had amassed high levels of debt, or leverage, before the COVID-19 pandemic. Out of precaution or necessity, firms increased their borrowing further after the onset. Although the shock to those firms’ value significantly increased their risk, measured by their distance-to-default, the default risk remains relatively small for most corporate debt. Nevertheless, the amount of outstanding liabilities among firms with elevated risk of insolvency is more than two times higher than at the peak of the global financial crisis.

  • Commercial Banks under Persistent Negative Rates

    2020-29

    Remy Beauregard and Mark M. Spiegel

    Do extended periods of negative policy interest rates continue to encourage commercial bank lending? A large panel of European and Japanese banks provides evidence on the impact of negative rates over different lengths of time. Analysis suggests that both bank profitability and bank lending activity erode more the longer such negative policy rates continue, primarily due to banks’ reluctance to pass negative rates along to retail depositors. This appears to negate one of the main arguments for moving policy rates below the zero bound.