Economic Letter
Brief summaries of SF Fed economic research that explain in reader-friendly terms what our work means for the people we serve.
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Do Opioids Slow Return to Work after Injuries?
David Neumark and Bogdan Savych
Some reports blame opioid use for part of the decline in labor force participation among adult men. Estimates based on workers’ compensation data shed light on the relationship between opioid prescriptions and the return to work among people who suffer work-related low-back injuries, for which opioid use is common. Differences in opioid prescribing patterns across locations demonstrate how various use of these medications can impact how quickly workers return to work. When opioids are prescribed for longer-term treatment, workers have considerably longer durations of temporary disability following an injury.
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A Review of the Fed’s Unconventional Monetary Policy
Glenn D. Rudebusch
The Federal Reserve has typically used a short-term interest rate as the policy tool for achieving its macroeconomic goals. However, with short-term rates constrained near zero for much of the past decade, the Fed was impelled to use two unconventional monetary policy tools: forward guidance and quantitative easing. These tools likely strengthened the economic recovery and helped return inflation to the Fed’s target—although their full impact remains uncertain.
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Has Inflation Sustainably Reached Target?
Adam Shapiro
A key measure of inflation finally reached the Fed’s 2% target in July after remaining persistently below that for years after the end of the last recession. Analysis shows that most of the increase in personal consumption expenditures price inflation towards the Fed’s target can be attributed to acyclical factors and are not due to a strengthening economy. While risks to the outlook for inflation appear broadly balanced, they include the considerable possibility that inflation has not yet sustainably reached target.
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The Labor Force Participation Rate Trend and Its Projections
Andreas Hornstein, Marianna Kudlyak, and Annemarie Schweinert
A labor force participation rate that is at or above its long-run trend is consistent with a labor market at or above full employment. In 2018, the estimated rate is at its trend of 62.8%, suggesting that the labor market is at full employment. Studying the population’s demographic makeup and labor trends for different groups sheds some light on what is driving the aggregate participation trend and implications for the future. Projections based on these trends estimate that labor participation will decline about 2.5 percentage points over the next decade.
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Why Aren’t U.S. Workers Working?
Mary C. Daly
Labor force participation among U.S. men and women ages 25 to 54 has been declining for nearly 20 years, a stark contrast with rising participation in Canada over this period. Three-fourths of the difference between the two countries can be explained by the growing gap in labor force attachment of women. A key factor is the extensive parental leave policies in Canada. If the United States could reverse the trend in participation of prime-age women to match Canada, it would see 5 million additional prime-age workers join the labor force.
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The Slope of the Yield Curve and the Near-Term Outlook
Jens H.E. Christensen
The yield spread between long-term and short-term Treasury securities is known to be a good predictor of economic activity, particularly of looming recessions. One way to learn more is through a careful scrutiny of the historical variation of such yield spreads and how they relate to the current slope of the Treasury yield curve. The results suggest that the recent flattening of the yield curve implies only a slightly elevated risk of a recession in the near term relative to any other month.
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How Persistent Are the Effects of Sentiment Shocks?
Jess Benhabib, Ben Shapiro, and Mark M. Spiegel
People’s feelings about the economy have been shown to be strongly connected to a state’s current economic health over short horizons. So, how well do such consumer sentiment measures coincide with economic growth over a longer period? Sentiment shocks are associated with large and statistically significant changes in state economic output over as long as a three-year horizon. While the sentiment shocks initially affect state consumption expenditures to a smaller degree, the impact tends to be more persistent, continuing as long as five years after the initial shock.
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The Prime-Age Workforce and Labor Market Polarization
Rob Valletta and Nathaniel Barlow
U.S. labor force participation by people in their prime working years fell substantially during the Great Recession, and it remains depressed despite some recovery since 2015. This appears to reflect longer-term developments, rather than lingering effects from the recession. One key factor is labor market polarization—manifested in the gradual disappearance of manual jobs—which helps predict declining worker attachment across states. This has been reinforced by other long-term economic and social trends, such as health considerations, that also have eroded prime-age labor force attachment.
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Information in the Yield Curve about Future Recessions
Michael D. Bauer and Thomas M. Mertens
The ability of the Treasury yield curve to predict future recessions has recently received a great deal of public attention. An inversion of the yield curve—when short-term interest rates are higher than long-term rates—has been a reliable predictor of recessions. The difference between ten-year and three-month Treasury rates is the most useful term spread for forecasting recessions—without any adjustment for an estimate of the underlying term premium. However, such correlations in the data do not identify cause and effect, which complicates their interpretation.
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The Financial Crisis at 10: Will We Ever Recover?
Regis Barnichon, Christian Matthes, and Alexander Ziegenbein
A decade after the last financial crisis and recession, the U.S. economy remains significantly smaller than it should be based on its pre-crisis growth trend. One possible reason lies in the large losses in the economy’s productive capacity following the financial crisis. The size of those losses suggests that the level of output is unlikely to revert to its pre-crisis trend level. This represents a lifetime present-value income loss of about $70,000 for every American.