Economic Letter

Bank supervisors engage in extensive monitoring of banking organizations in order to enforce regulations and to guard against systemic risk. In the United States, primary responsibility for monitoring bank holding companies (BHCs) falls to the Federal Reserve.

When it comes to compromise, we can take comfort in the old saying, “half a loaf is better than none.” But when it comes to legislation on deposit insurance reform now before Congress, that old saying takes a new twist: “half a loaf is even better than a whole loaf.”

It is somewhat surprising that house prices in most parts of the nation have stayed high despite the downturn in the economy. As Figure 1 shows, real (inflation-adjusted) house price changes became negative with GDP growth during the last recession in 1991; but this time, they have remained positive and appear to be firm.

Recently, some concerns about a “credit crunch” in the U.S. economy have appeared in the business press. In the commercial paper market, a number of large firms were reportedly unable to borrow from this market, as investors reassessed the credit risk of these firms amid growing accounting concerns.

This Economic Letter summarizes the papers presented at the conference “Macroeconomic Models for Monetary Policy” held at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco on March 1-2, 2002, under the joint sponsorship of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.

There is little doubt that when central banks, including the Federal Reserve, set interest rates, they do so purposefully, with particular goals and objectives in mind. But what are these goals and objectives? And if the Federal Reserve behaves systematically, what is it systematically responding to?

In recent years, the personal saving rate in the United States has fallen sharply, and it is now at a very low level compared either to U.S. historical experience or to the savings behavior of many other industrialized countries. From 1980 through 1994, the U.S. saving rate averaged 8%; thereafter, it fell steeply, and since mid-2000, with allowance made for the tax rebates that boosted household saving in the months of July, August, and September 2001, it has averaged approximately 1%.

In January 2001, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) reported that the federal government was projected to run a $313 billion surplus in 2002. Now, just a little over a year later, the CBO’s latest reports indicate a major deterioration in the budget projections.

Are turning points in the economy—recessions and recoveries—hard to predict? Recent experience may not tell us much: although almost no forecaster predicted the onset of the latest U.S. recession, unusual forces may have been at work this time around. But what about more typical recessions? And what about recoveries?